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Abstract
The paper defines financial liberalization, distinguishing between liberalization of domestic financial
markets  and  capital  account  convertibility.  It  then  examines  the  stages  and  the  strategy  of  Indian
financial reform. The Indian strategy followed a well thought out sequence whereby full capital account
liberalization was to come after deepening domestic markets, and improving government finances. One
alone is dangerous without the others. The experience of the global crisis has validated the Indian
strategy  and  also  shown  that  foreign  entry  has  benefits  but  cannot  resolve  all  issues.  Deepening
domestic markets and better domestic and international regulation is a necessary prerequisite for full
convertibility. The direction of future liberalization should be such as meets Indian needs of financial
inclusion, infrastructure finance, and domestic market deepening.
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1.  Introduction 
Broadly liberalization means a greater role and more freedoms for markets but there 
are  at  least  three  components  of  financial  liberalization.  It  can r e f e r  t o  f r e e i n g  
domestic  markets  and  institutions,  to  allowing  foreign  entry,  and  to  the  type  of 
financial regulation. 
 
Pre reform South Asia had severe financial repression. Financial markets had little 
freedom, most interest rates were administered, and the aim of a plethora of controls 
was  to  make  funds  available  for  different  types  of  Government  programs.  The 
government fixed the exchange rates. There was scarcity and rationing of foreign 
exchange so neither the current nor the capital account of the balance of payment was 
convertible.  
 
Reforms have freed markets and developed underlying institutions, but it has been a 
gradual  process  with  graded  restrictions o n  f o r e i g n  e n t r y .  M o r e  o p e n n e s s  c r e a t e d  
more volatility, but on the whole, was beneficial. The sectors with the maximum 
foreign entry were not the most successful in achieving domestic development goals. 
These goals should define the future path of future reform as the strategic removal of 
controls,  combined  with  development  of d o m e s t i c  m a r k e t s  c o n t i n u e s .  T h e  p a p e r  
draws out the implication for reform in different financial sectors.   
  
The structure of the paper is as follows: after a discussion of financial liberalization in 
Section 2; Section 3 discusses its consequences. Section 4 draws out lessons from the 
experience of global crises; Section 5 links the path of future liberalization and to 
critical development imperatives; Section 6 gives a snapshot of domestic development 
issues in the financial sector; Section 7 brings out lessons for the structure and reform 
of regulation; before Section 8 concludes. 
 
2.  Post Reform: Liberalization 
  1The post reform period beginning in the early nineties in India and a little later in 
other  South  Asian  countries  has  seen  considerable  institutional  and  market 
development. More interest rates became market determined. In India, at the time of 
writing,  only  interest  rates  on  savings  accounts,  government  small  savings  and 
providence schemes are administered. Many private and foreign banks and mutual 
funds  entered.  Restructuring,  computerization  and  competition  improved  banking 
services and parameters such as non-performing assets. There was a rise in the share 
of retail credit.  
 
India  used  new  technology  effectively  to  create  electronic  markets  reaching  and 
sometimes exceeding international benchmarks in disclosure norms, trading volume, 
settlement cycle, and low transaction costs.  In the order driven screen-based trading 
system, each investor can access the same market and order book, at the same price 
and cost, irrespective of location. Dematerialization of securities reduced bad paper 
risk. Exchanges were corporatised and demutualized, the National Stock Exchange 
provided effective competition to the older BSE. A number of commodity exchanges 
entered.  Settlement  was  now  through  clearing  corporations.  Derivatives  were 
gradually introduced and soon achieved high trading volumes. Strict norms regarding 
disclosure  of  price  sensitive  information  and  conflicts  of  interest,  contributed  to 
reducing asymmetries of information in price discovery. 
 
Changes in technology have had fundamental effects on the possibility of regulation, 
and on safe innovation. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) continued as the regulator 
of  banks.  New  financial  regulatory  institutions  set  up  were  the  Securities  and 
Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the insurance regulator: Insurance Regulatory and 
Development Authority (IRDA), the commodity futures trading regulator: Forward 
Market  Commission  (FMC),  and  the  interim  pension  regulator:  Pension  Fund 
Regulatory and Development Authority (PFRDA). In general controls gave way to 
market  based  regulation.  Rule-based  system  largely  relying  on  self-certification 
replaced cumbersome administrative procedure that required multiple discretionary 
approvals.  Along  with  traditional  oversight,  advanced  risk  management  systems 
promoted  transparency,  efficiency,  safety,  and  market  integrity.  Practices  included 
online monitoring and surveillance, positions limits, margin requirements, and circuit 
filters. A 2006 amendment to the RBI Act expanded its regulatory powers beyond 
  2banks to cover the financial system as a whole and to give directions to all agencies 
active  in  markets.  However,  procedural  aspects  of  trade  remained  with  SEBI,  the 
capital market regulator. 
 
There were rapid developments also in FX and money markets after 2000. A central 
counterparty,  CCIL  (Clearing  Corporation  of  India)  was  set  up  to  undertake 
guaranteed settlement for government securities (G Secs), repos in G Secs and FX 
market trades, following IOSCO/CPSS best practices. Infrastructure was created for 
electronic  payments  and  real  time  gross  settlement  (RTGS),  and  steps  taken  to 
encourage the migration from paper money. 
 
After  an  initial  double  devaluation  of  the  Indian  exchange  rate  in  June  1991,  it 
became a managed float. The degree of flexibility and market determination increased 
with the deepening of FX markets. The nineties saw steady depreciation, covering for 
India’s relatively higher inflation so there was no large deviation of the real effective 
exchange rate (REER) established after the initial devaluation. Two-way movement 
of the nominal rate began from 2003 as the dollar depreciated. The swings became 
wide after the global financial crisis due to substantial movement of portfolio capital. 
 
Although  the  reforms  established  current  account  convertibility,  with  the  foreign 
exchange  regulation  act  (FERA)  being  changed  to  foreign  exchange  management 
(FEMA),  convertibility  of  the  capital  account  was  more g r a d u a l .  L i b e r a l i z a t i o n  
distinguished between types and direction of flows and was much greater for equity 
compared to debt flows including bank loans, and for foreign compared to domestic 
residents. Requirements for the latter’s transactions were liberalized before portfolio 
outflows. Among debt inflows long-term debt was to be liberalized before short-term. 
The rationale was equity, in contrast to debt, shares in and therefore reduces liabilities 
in a crisis. Selective deregulation aimed to develop markets even while restricting 
foreign  participation  until  they  reached  sufficient  maturity  to  be  able  to  handle 
volatility. 
 
Both Bangladesh and Pakistan declared full current account convertibility in 1994, a 
few years after India did. While convertibility remained partial on the capital account 
for both, Bangladesh retained more controls compared to Pakistan.  
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In Pakistan, reforms gained momentum after 1997. Foreign banks were allowed to 
bring  in  and  take  capital  out,  remit  profits,  dividends  and  fees  without  any  prior 
approval.  Corporate  sector  could  acquire  equity  abroad.  Resident  Pakistanis  could 
open foreign currency accounts with banks in Pakistan, freely transferable abroad, 
exempted from income and wealth tax, with no questions about the source of foreign 
exchange. Foreign investors could purchase up to 100 percent of equity in industrial 
companies on repatriable basis. Shares could be exported and remittance of dividend 
and  disinvestment  was  permissible  without p r i o r  a p p r o v a l  o f  t h e  S t a t e  B a n k  o f  
Pakistan (SBP). Income tax treatment of foreign private investment was at par with 
similar  investment  made  by  local  citizens. T h e r e  w e r e  n o  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o n  f o r e i g n  
banks. 
 
After  1998  reforms  included  privatization  of a n d  f r e e  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  s t a t e  
owned enterprises except for few specified industries. Foreign investors were given 
permission to retain 100 percent equity in a company with no obligation to go public; 
they had permission to bring in any amount of foreign currency and to take it out 
freely. 
 
In contrast, in Bangladesh, resident owned capital is not freely transferable abroad. It 
is subject to prior Bangladesh Bank (BB) approval, which is given only sparingly. So 
even current settlements, beyond certain indicative limits, are subject to bonafides 
checks.  Direct  and  portfolio  investments  of  non-residents, c a p i t a l  g a i n s  a n d  
profits/dividends are repatriable abroad.  
 
Reform also freed the domestic financial sector from controls. In Pakistan, SLR has 
been brought down to around 20 percent of total demand and time liabilities from its 
highest of 45 percent at one point of time. Caps on maximum lending rates of banks 
and NBFIs for most trade and project related modes of financing were removed in 
1995. Caps and floors on minimum lending rates were abolished in July1997. Banks 
and  NBFIs  were  able  to  set  their  lending  rates  in  relation  to  the  demand/supply 
conditions in the market. Monetary policy uses indirect tools such as open market 
operations, discount rates etc. Domestic interest rates on lending dropped to 5 percent 
  4from 20 percent. The creation of SECP aimed at establishing a professional agency 
that would improve the regulation and supervision of the securities market 
 
Although Bangladesh’s financial sector has strengthened, government interventions in 
the form of ceilings, moral suasion, and directed credit still exist. Accounting and 
reporting is non-transparent. Banks are free to fix rates of interest on their deposits of 
different types after withdrawal of restriction on the floor rate of interest in 1997. 
Banks are also free to fix their rates of interest on lending except for export sector, 
which was fixed at 7 percent per annum with effect from January 10, 2004. SLR has 
been changed in the past decade but on an average has been around 20 percent. 
 
In both countries the debt market remains underdeveloped. No benchmark rate or 
yield curve exists because of absence of long-term debt instruments and administered 
interest  rates  on  popular  government  instruments.  It  also  suffers  from  lack  or 
regulation, infrastructure, expertise and innovation. Other problems are absence of 
institutional investors because of various impediments and passive capital market. 
 
Pakistan adopted a market-based unified exchange rate system from 19th May 1999. 
Since 2001, despite its preference for a floating rate, SBP has attempted to maintain 
the real effective exchange rate at a competitive level. It intervenes from time to time 
to keep stability in the market and smooth excessive fluctuations. Bangladesh also 
adopted a floating exchange rate regime since 31 May 2003. Under the regime, BB 
does not interfere in the determination of exchange rate, but operates monetary policy 
to  minimize  extreme  swings  in  the  exchange  rate  that  could  have  adverse 
repercussions. In the forex market, banks are free to buy and sale foreign currency in 
the spot and also in the forward markets. 
 
In sum these countries have been proceeding on the same liberalization path as India, 
with some lags. Pakistan has the most open capital account. 
 
3.  Consequences of Financial Liberalization 
Trend growth rose in the post reform period, but so did volatility. Opening out had 
coincided  with  a  period  of  major  international  financial  crises.  But  conservative 
  5regulation  and  the  gradual  approach  meant the financial sector did not undergo a 
crisis.   
 
A distinction was made between different types of Private Foreign Investments
1 (FIs).  



















































FDI FPI NRI deposits- inflows
 
Figure 1 shows some of the categories of inflows as a percentage of GDP. There was 
steady acceleration in FDI, which is an equity type flow, and higher levels continued 
despite the global crisis. The Figure also shows how the absorptive capacity of the 
economy increased. USD 3b in the beginning of reform came to about 1.5 percent of 
GDP  and  $29b  in  2007-08  came  to  a  similar  ratio  as  GDP  had  increased.  Gross 
inflows  were  even  higher,  since  Indian  firms  began  investing  abroad.  FPI  shows 
fluctuations, turning briefly negative both during the East Asian and global financial 
crisis. NRI flows did not have the same amplification. They respond to opportunities 
for interest rate arbitrage, but NRI deposit rates were capped in the later years. So 
NRI inflows were quite low when other types of inflows were booming. 
 
Figure 2 shows that reserve accumulation was the mirror image of the capital account. 
It was volatile capital flows that were absorbed as reserves
2, while the current account 
                                                 
1 These include Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) and other long- 
and short-term investment flows. The analysis builds upon earlier work, in particular Goyal 2010a. All 
references are not given to save space but are available at www.igidr.ac.in/~ashima. Figures quoted, 
unless otherwise mentioned, are from IMF, RBI, Ministry of Finance, SPB and BB websites. 
2 India’s foreign currency reserves peaked at $ 315.66 billion in June 2008 and had fallen to 262 billion 
in end March 2009, when they exceeded India’s foreign debt by just $ 22 billion. Although outflows 
were only $20 billion, much of the fall was due to valuation effects.   
  6deficit (CAD) was about 1-2 percent of GDP. Reserves provided self-insurance, and 
damped volatility of the exchange rate, but had a cost. Given India’s higher interest 
rates, the sterilization of reserve accumulation, to maintain targeted rates of money 
supply growth imposed large interest costs borne by the Government, RBI and banks. 
The RBI has to pay more on Government bonds it sells in India compared to what it 
earns on assets held abroad. 
 





















































Current Account  Capital Account  Reserves, inc-,dec+
 
Global  Depository  Receipts  (GDRs)  allowed  firms  to  raise  equity  abroad  and 
relaxation of External Commercial Borrowing (ECB) norms in 2006 allowed them 
access to cheaper loans. Domestic interest rates exceeding foreign and an exchange 
rate expected to appreciate created incentives to borrow abroad. Restrictions such as 
eligibility  criteria,  caps,  minimum  maturity  period  and  end  use  criteria  prevented 
excessive  borrowing  in  response  to  domestic  distortions,  even  while  selective 
relaxation  for  longer-term  debt  made  credit a v a i l a b l e  f o r  l a r g e  c o r p o r a t e s  a n d  f o r  
infrastructure funding. 
 
Partial capital convertibility gave flexibility along the line of control, making selective 
tightening feasible if necessary. Additional instruments were available to tackle the 
policy trilemma, giving some monetary autonomy even under volatile capital inflows. 
Fine-tuning was possible. For example, stricter end use criteria were imposed for 
firms  bringing  funds  in  during  periods  of  excessive  inflows.  Inflows  have  to  be 
allowed to go out if they are to come in,  but  continuing  restrictions  on  domestic 
capital  outflows  reduce  the  reserve  cover  required.  But,  as  reserves  accumulated, 
  7selective  easing  of  outflows  by  domestic  residents  and  further  trade  liberalization 
were used as another way of absorbing inflows.  
 
The  CAD  is  also  the  excess  of  domestic s a v i n g s  o v e r  i n v e s t m e n t .  A  s m a l l  C A D  
dia’s policy strategy of “middling through” followed a well thought out sequence 
 Pakistan and Bangladesh (Figure 3 and 4, in USD billions) the change in reserves is 
the reverse. 
                                                
implied the contribution of foreign savings to financing the resource gap remained 
small,  although  they  contributed  to  relieving  sectoral  financing  constraints. 
Macroeconomic policy affects the investment savings gap and therefore the extent of 
inflow  absorption,  which  also  depends  on  a  general  rise  in  absorptive  capacity. 
Reducing  the  gap  between  domestic  and  foreign  interest  rates  would  support  the 
domestic investment environment. More appreciation would increase net imports and 
the CAD. But persistent current account deficits imply there are limits to appreciation. 
Temporary capital inflows do not always reflect fundamentals and cannot determine 
the equilibrium exchange rate.  
 
In
whereby  full  capital  account  liberalization  was  to  come  after  deepening  domestic 
markets,  and  better  government  finances.  Liberalizing,  deepening  markets  and 
improving institutions and policy form a package. One alone is dangerous without the 
others. Research and empirical estimation has found that only countries with strong 
domestic institutions, markets and government finances benefit from foreign inflows. 
These features determine absorptive capacity that reduces volatility and also gives 
countries  the  ability  to  withstand  volatility.  The  crisis  showed  that  stronger 
international  financial  architecture  and  regulation  are  also  preconditions  for  full 
capital account liberalization. Countries with more controls have a lower probability 
of crisis (Ostroy et. al. 2010).  
  
In
not the mirror image of capital inflows
3. First, the current account was much more 
volatile, reserves had to be frequently used to finance it. Second, inflows were not so 
substantial and, at least for Pakistan were often the result of IMF loans. Bangladesh 
saw a sharp improvement in its current account after 2005, while for Pakistan it was 
 
3 Due to lack of data on capital flows they are derived as change in reserves plus current account deficit 
for Pakistan and Bangladesh. 
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4.  Crisis Lessons 
oreign inflows do make more resources available, demonstrate better organization 
r a stimulus to local investment, give an opportunity for better 
F
and technology, offe
allocation of world savings, and for better price discovery in markets. But inflows to 
emerging markets (EMs) are subject to sudden stops or reversals due to infectious 



















































DI was relatively stable, suggesting it is worth reducing hurdles to entry.  FPI was 
olatile. Figure 5 shows how FPI affected the stock market index. But it resumed soon 
ed entry costs 
r  the  retail  investor.  The  share  of  household  financial  savings  in  shares  and 
 c r e d i t  s u f f e r e d  
verely as international credit markets froze. Even for long-term loans, reset clauses 




with Indian growth prospects, and also demonstrated the risk sharing effect. Inflows 
were three times larger than outflows for equivalent variation in market indices. As 
markets fell during outflows the value remitted was lower. In the two years prior to 
October 2007 the BSE stock index rose from 8000 to 20,000 and FPI inflows were $ 
47 billion. But over the next year, as stock markets fell back to 8000, outflows were 
only $15 billion. Despite higher volatility in narrow markets, the FPI inflows did 
benefit firms. Loans became easier to get and more venture capital entered, in the high 
growth period of 2003-08, as the ratio of gross investment to GDP rose from 25.2 to 
39.1, and again as investment demonstrated a sharp recovery in 2010.   
 
But households did not benefit. Retail participation shrank. Reforms rais
fo
debentures post-reform were low at 5.1 percent in 2005-06 compared to 23.3 percent 
pre-reform in 1991-92. Pre Lehman (2007-08) they had increased to 12.5 percent; but 
post  (2007-08)  collapsed  again  to  2.6  percent.  Free  foreign  entry  was  allowed  in 
mutual funds, but they focused on high-end customers, and on firms. Despite entry of 
new private banks 60 percent of the population remained unbanked.  
 
Firms  who  were  dependent  on  foreign  trade  and  other  short-term
se
  10interest  differential  is  a  precondition  for more  wholesale  liberalization  of  external 
borrowing. 
 
Thus foreign entry is not a panacea. Foreign entry helps but it alone cannot deepen 
markets. Other conditions also have to be in place. Eventual internationalization of 
dian  financial  services  is  required  as  Indian  companies  go  global.  But  the 
licy response. It 
as not arbitrage driven by low developed country interest rates since the federal fund 
t rates 
t home is leading to portfolio rebalancing towards EMs. The promised tightening of 
In
sequencing  has  to  be  correct.  Considerable  deepening  of  equity  markets  and 
improvements  in  regulation  have  taken  place  but  more  broad  basing  is  required. 
Given the high domestic savings ratios a larger percentage of household savings going 
to  markets  would  make  them  more  stable,  as  well  as  meeting  investment  needs 
without too large and risky an expansion in current account deficits.  
 
The  sharp  rise  in  inflows  after  2003  was  partly  an  aberration  due  to  regulatory 
weakness in developed countries, so self-insurance was the correct po
w
rate peaked at 5.25 percent in 2007. Rather high leverage, given regulatory capture by 
investment banks, enhanced flows in response to profit opportunities. When Lehman 
Brothers failed its leverage was 30:1 compared to 15:1 for a commercial bank.  
 
During the exit in 2010 the West and emerging markets (EMs) are in different phases 
of their macroeconomic cycle. Higher growth in EMs and the near zero interes
a
global  regulations  has  been  relegated  to  the  future  and  large  Western  financial 
institutions are being encouraged to improve their impaired profits through trading. 
The hype being built up about emerging Asia is pushing them here, just as the hype 
about the “miracle economies” pushed herds of investors into East Asia, building up 
bubbles, which eventually burst. Controls and prudential requirements are an essential 
line of defense. They can be designed to be market friendly. India has become a 
member of the financial action task force (FATF) against global terrorism and money 
laundering. Detailed electronic trails, linked information, and KYC norms makes it 
possible  to  discriminate  between  origins  and  types  of  flows  together  with  central 
registration that reduces transaction costs. Pure controls involve restrictives on cross 
border  flows  by  residence.  Market  based  controls  include  un-remunerated  reserve 
requirements and taxes. For debt -pure controls must continue, but for portfolio flows 
  11the latter set may be considered if necessary, ideally as part of a global agreement on 
handling capital account distortions. 
 
Capital  resists  taxes  by  arguing  that  it  would  increase  costs  for  the  country  that 
imposes them. But just as prudential regulations are considered necessary for market 
ability, if cross border taxes contribute to crisis proofing they lower costs over the 
ed help from 
e IMF 7 times
4. In contrast Bangladesh had only one arrangement with the IMF in 
 predicated on domestic 
forms is a better strategy of liberalization. Distinction between types of flows is 
ning,  and  rise  in  absorptive  capacity w i t h  t h e  r e a l  s e c t o r  a s  p r i o r i t y .  
provements in international financial regulation or regional arrangements would 
                                                
st
longer-run. Costs are also minimal if one country is not doing it alone.   
 
Pakistan  had  a  much  freer  capital  account  than  Bangladesh.  Taking  1995  as  the 
reform date for the two countries, in the post reform period Pakistan need
th
2003.  India,  which  also  retained  capital  controls  and  had  more  capital  market 
deepening compared to Bangladesh
5 did not have to go to the IMF at all. Its good 
growth performance led to large inflows of private capital. So while strategic controls 
are protective, so is domestic market deepening.   
 
There is a perspective that regards any departure from full liberalization as a failure of 
reforms. But experience shows a carefully sequenced path
re
useful and must be retained. In South Korea the security of reserves led to high short-
term debt. So the latter has to be discouraged regardless of other buffers. Free foreign 
entry without the other harder preconditions would put the country to unnecessary 
risk. 
 
Transparent sequenced capital account convertibility should follow domestic financial 
deepe
Im
allow faster liberalization. 
 
 
4 There were two arrangements with the IMF in 1997 one in each of 1993, 1995, 2000, 2001, and 2008. 
5 A  r e v i e w  o f  t h e  o u t c o m e s  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s e c t o r  a d j u s t m e n t  c r e d i t  ( F S A C ) ,  w h i c h  B a n g l a d e s h  
contracted with the World Bank, done under the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative 
(SAPRI) in 2000 indicated that although reform implementation was satisfactorily, desired outcome 
were not achieved. 
 
  12 Asian Integration 
The 1990s crisis activated regional financial forums, even though there was no history 
f coordination in Asia. After the East Asian crisis Asian countries reformed their 
But  reform  of  the  International  Financial  System  (IFS),  which 
 advantages from coordination, given 
e  continuing  dollar  weakness,  resistance  to  and  slow  pace  of  reform  in  the 
lization.  It can even raise the 
robability of optimal globalization by improving the balance of global power and 
97, with initial focus on macroeconomic and 
nancial issues. Results included setting up regional liquidity support arrangements 
                                                
o
financial  systems. 
could have prevented the global crisis, was not carried out since lender countries and 
interests  dominated  international  financial  institutions  Goyal  (2010a).  Aid  was 
arranged much faster for Mexico in 1995 than it was for Asia in 1997.  So Asia was 
pushed to adopt self-insurance and cooperation measures that improved its bargaining 
position and helped it survive the global crisis.  
 
South Asia is inadequately involved in these, although there are beginnings, which 
need to be pursued vigorously. There are many
th
international financial architecture. The large intraregional Asian trade could benefit 
from financing within the region
6. High Asian growth and trade expansion provide 
incentives for such moves. Stable Asian savings would become available to finance 
large Asian infrastructure needs. Credit markets freeze due to problems in Western 
banks partly caused the crash in Asian exports in 2008.  
 
Alternatives to Western markets, currencies and institutions would make the globe 
more stable. Regionalism is not incompatible with globa
p
stability. A consensus may more easily be hammered out at the regional level and 
then taken to the international forums. 
 
Leaders of the 10 ASEAN member countries along with the PRC, Japan, and Korea 
initiated the ASEAN+3 process in 19
fi
through  the  Chiang  Mai  Initiative  (CMI), e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  A s i a n  B o n d  F u n d  
(ABF),  and  progress  on  the  Asian  Bond  Market  Initiative  (ABMI).  Medium-term 
aims  included  the  establishment  of  a  regional  financing  facility,  a  mechanism  for 
 
6 Asian intraregional trade accounts for about 50 percent of total trade, but its intraregional financial 
integration is limited. In 2004 intraregional cross-border portfolio liabilities were 2.25 percent of Asian 
GDP, its liabilities to either North America or the European Union were more than three times as 
much. 
  13closer coordination on exchange rates, and establishment of regional surveillance. The 
Economic Review and Policy Dialogue (ERPD) was the first step working through 
information exchange, policy discussions, and peer reviews. There was some progress 




Among  these  bodies  South  Asian  countries  are  involved  only  in  the  Asia-Europe 
Meeting  (ASEM),  which  has  financial  market  development  and  strengthening 
conomic cooperation between Asia and Europe as part of its limited agenda, and 
tion of the CMI. A crisis-affected member could 
mediately  obtain  liquidity  support  for  the  first  20  percent  of  USD  90  billion 
 
pport. The solution was to make the EPRD effective and move to multilateralization 
                                                
e
SEANZA  (Southeast  Asia,  New  Zealand  and  Australia),  which  is  concerned  with 
capacity building among central banks. India is part of the East Asia Summit (EAS), 
comprising the ASEAN + 3 members, Australia, India and New Zealand, concerned 
with strengthening regional economic cooperation among members. Many of these 
bodies are handicapped by the absence of secretariats, poor focus and coordination 
and conflicts of interests among members, so progress is slow. For example, EAS 
uses the ASEAN Secretariat.  
 
The global financial crisis gave another push to efforts to promote regional financial 
stability, including multilateraliza
im
bilateral  swap  agreements  (BSAs)  in  the  CMI,  but  the  remaining  80  percent  was 
linked to an IMF program and its conditionality. Potential creditors, including Japan 
and the PRC were concerned to avoid creating moral hazard. Demands for assistance 
could be due to poor policy fundamentals, requiring effective adjustment. The main 
ASEAN  swap  arrangement,  which  allowed  member  banks  to  swap  their  local 
currencies with major international currencies, was only US$2 billion on April 2009. 
 
When hit hard by currency speculation and capital flow reversals  in  2008,  Korea 
found the CMI inadequate. Instead, it went to the US Fed for precautionary liquidity
su
of  the  CMI.  The  CMIM,  signed  on  24  December  2009,  will  have  a  more 
institutionalized structure, with an independent surveillance unit under the guidance 
 
7 This section is based on Goyal (2010), Kawai (2009, 2010) and Jung (2008). 
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increased and an active EPRD will enable it to be made available in a more flexible 
manner,  comparable  to  the  IMF’s  FCL,  but  delinked  from  the  IMF.  The  CMIM 
includes all the low-income ASEAN members, which were excluded from the CMI 
BSAs. This more inclusive arrangement opens up the possibility of the participation 
of other countries. 
 
Studies are also taking place on medium- to long-term currency coordination to avoid 
competitive devaluations.  Since  the  CMIM  weights  have  been  agreed  to  they  can 
rm the basis for individual currency weights in a proposed regional monetary unit, 
vesting in regional bonds to contribute to the development of regional 
ond markets, and reduce dependence on dollar denominated assets. ASEAN + 3 is 
 savings and 
urces for infrastructure investment, recycle the region’s large savings for regional 
rogress  fastest  in  the 
irections that satisfy critical development needs. Since India leads other South Asian 
now.  The needs 
fo
which  could  act  as  a  benchmark  for  individual  currencies,  limiting  their  relative 
movements. 
 
The ABF, a fund comprising foreign exchange reserves of regional member CBs, has 
the aim of in
b
also  seeking  to  strengthen  regional  markets  through  the  ABMI,  and  building  a 
common  market  structure:  securitisation,  a  credit  guarantee,  credit  rating  and 
settlement system, essential for developing regional market interaction.  
 
A well functioning ABM would make the Asian financial system more balanced by 
encouraging markets as well as banks, provide alternative avenues for
so
long-term investment, thus reducing maturity and currency mismatches, and global 
imbalances, as dependence on US capital markets would fall. 
 
5.  Future Liberalization and Critical Development Imperatives 
Future  domestic  and  external  liberalization  is  likely  to  p
d
countries in market and institutional development we focus on India 
are: 
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financial inclusion is a major aim, the reforms have not been so successful 
inancial markets have been unable to leverage the shampoo sachet effect: that is to 
o  Education of investors, increasing financial literacy 
 
e of entry, exit 
low  cost  instruments—index  funds, 
 
he sub-brokers that households trusted disappeared from the markets, in favour of 
frastructure financing 
re  is  both  a  bottleneck  and  an  opportunity.  Spending  on 
Although 
in  this.  The  idea  of  inclusion  has  to  expand  beyond  just  availability  of  credit  to 
expansion of banking, insurance and other financial services. 
 
F
evolve a low denomination strategy to tap the huge potential numbers that make low 
margin-high volume a viable business model in India. In order to do so systemic 
features that discourage small investors have to be removed, their confidence built up, 
and positive incentives offered. Possible measures include:  
 
o  Making one point disinterested information available
o  Reducing transaction costs in using technology for eas
o  Registering and rating of agents 
o  Promoting  simple  transparent 
ETFs 
T
technology  enabled  distribution.  But  given  the  large  job  requirement  in  India,  a 
technology plus people strategy may be more viable. Trusted technology enabled sub 
brokers with local knowledge should be reestablished. Some big broking houses are 
setting up large national chains. 
  
In
Poor  Indian  infrastructu
infrastructure is currently 6 percent of GDP, and is expected to reach 9-12 percent to 
finance one trillion US$ over the 12 Plan, 2013-2017.  Long-term finance is required, 
and developing bond markets has some urgency in this context. More retail, pension 
funds participation, and limited investment by such foreign investors in long-term 
rupee denominated bonds could contribute. Limits are necessary since structures can 
be created to index local currency denominated bonds to or make them payable in 
foreign currency thus creating currency risk.  
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isk: Derivative markets 
ot only development of instruments and markets but also 
omplex  derivatives  can  be  misused  to  create  positions  where  the  risk  is  non-
lthough one leg of every OTC trade is regulated in India, so information is available 
limited quantities. New instruments such as take out financing are beginning to be 
used to rollover short-term financing, and allow exit of risk capital. After a project 
begins earning, other more risk-averse types of capital is willing to participate. Such 
instruments can enable its entry. Experience has been gained in PPP contracts with 
good  incentive  features.  They  allow  allocation  of  tasks  according  to  comparative 
advantage and of risk to parties best able to bear it.  
 
R
Laying-off risk requires n
random movements in asset prices so that agents are not able to speculate on expected 
one-way  movements.  In  thin  markets,  regulators  sometimes  have  to  create  such 
movements, even while restraining excess volatility. Since firms can’t sell insurance 
to those who need it in imperfect markets, they may underinsure reversals of capital 
inflow.  A  well  functioning  bond  market,  for  example,  also  allows  firms  needing 
external resources to share their revenues with those with access to foreign funds 
(Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2004). 
 
C
transparent  even  to  the  holder.  In  2007  many  Indian  firms  entered  into  so  called 
hedging deals, which were actually complex bets on the value of the Swiss Franc. 
With the steep rupee depreciation in 2008 many firms lost money.  
 
A
to the regulator, it is not available to the market as a whole. Standardized exchange 
traded instruments have the advantage of simplicity and more transparency. So risks 
are known. The crisis has demonstrated the robustness of exchanges compared to 
other financial institutions. Worldwide no exchange failed since they have multiple 
risk management systems, and SPAN to cover tail risks. Post crisis worldwide there is 
a move to more exchange traded instruments. But currently day trading dominates in 
many  instruments  since  physical  delivery  is l i m i t e d .  I t  i s  n ecessary  to  increase 
contrarian positions, open positions and hedging. 
 
  176.  Inclusion and Domestic Development 
Banks 
Indian banks, especially private banks, provide better services to large corporates and 
HNIs. For example average loan rates for blue chips was 5-7% but for MSEs it varied 
over  9-11.25%.  As  established  firms  began  raising  credit  abroad at cheaper rates, 
banks turned to retail credit, consumer durable and housing finance expanded. The 
SARFAESI Act 2002, and fledgling credit bureaus making credit histories available 
have contributed to the expansion of credit. Banks also participate in infrastructure 
finance, but do not have the scale and size to meet large financing needs. Indian credit 
deposit ratios remain one of the lowest in the world. There is considerable scope for 
expansion.  
 
Banking  penetration  is  poor  partly  because  technology  was  not  available.  But 
technology has improved. Although banks have been slow in making optimum use of 
technology. RBI wants to give banks the opportunity to leverage new technology and 
widespread agent network. 
 
The  very  rapid  growth  in  mobile  usage, t h e i r  w i d e  p e n e t r a t i o n ,  c o m p e t i t i o n  a n d  
dynamism in designing new products, suggests permitting mobile financial services 
would enable rapid strides in financial inclusion. Delays and transaction costs would 
fall for users. A mobile-based product would make customers independent of agents. 
Business correspondents (BCs) (the RBI’s favoured mode of inclusion) would only be 
required for enrollment, cash deposit and cash withdrawal. Whereas, in a smart card 
based  technology,  an  agent  is  required  for  initiation  of  all  transactions.  Account 
details and the transaction data are stored on the smart card.  
    
The provision of additional banking services, increasing access to credit, and raising 
the level of savings, for those currently excluded from the formal financial sector is 
the additional advantage of bank involvement even in mobile financial services. India 
has  about  100  million  migrant  workers  from  central  India  who  need  to  send 
remittances home. Their security would increase since they would no longer have to 
carry cash.  
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specific policies have included expanding permitted points of service for small value 
transactions, for example by allowing MSPs to function as BCs, regularizing pilot 
projects, reducing the reporting requirements to set up no-frills bank accounts, and 
subsidizing inclusion for non-banked population. 
 
But after more than a year of the approval for mobile banking transaction volumes 
remained  low  in  2010.  Banks  found  end-to-end  encryption  costly,  and  wanted  to 
avoid it for low value transactions. They found entering into partnerships with MSPs 
difficult. There are conflicts on the value creation by each party. But regulators have 
to increase competition between alternative service providers. If banks take too long, 
alternatives must be explored to ensure inclusion. Unbundling allows competition in 
one component. The RBI in 2008-09 did do away with encryption for amounts less 
than Rs 5000. It also lowered reporting requirements on the reasoning that small cards 
cannot  be  used  for  terrorist  financing.  Limits  can  be  revised  upwards  to  permit 
transactions like air-ticket purchase. 
  
It  also  permitted  non-bank  entities  to  issue  mobile-based  prepaid  payment 
instruments, based on representation from MSPs. But the response was poor. MSPs 
value added services have to improve. They are interested in the financial float, but 
RBI regards this as equivalent to deposit taking, which it is not willing to allow non-
banks. There is a problem in extending deposit insurance to non-banks.  
 
Markets 
The new stock exchange established, NSE, was supposed to compete with the older, 
BSE,  but  it  soon  became  dominant  with  85  percent  market  share.  In  electronic 
markets physical distance does not matter, so the regional stock exchanges also died. 
Electronic markets work like a network, costs fall in the one that is able to attract 
more customers, so others also find it in their interest to migrate and the equilibrium 
tips over. In the days of floor trading the greatest geographical clustering of financial 
intermediaries  had  the  advantage.  But  with  ICT  geographically  dispersed 
intermediaries can provide liquidity. The exchange with the best technology attracts 
the most customers. The governance structure of exchanges also changes to a for 
profit corporations from a no-profit club of intermediaries distributing the rent among 
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help in improving technology, which is now the main avenue of competition. BSE 
also demutualized but was unable to compete with NSE’s more modern processes. 
Aware of the possibilities of tipping in networks, markets managements try to lock in 
customers  in  various  ways.  Therefore  regulators  have  to  be  proactive  to  maintain 
competition. For example, the judiciary had to intervene in the famous Microsoft 
case. Competition alone was inadequate given the possibility of tying software.  
 
America’s  security  and  exchange  commission  (SEC)  has  a  “best-price”  stock-
handling rule to maintain competition across exchanges.  But when NYSE was using 
favourable network effects to lock-in users, resist automation, and reward insiders, 
SEC  leveled  the  playing  field  by  allowing  “fast”  automated  markets  that  execute 
trades automatically to bypass a better price on a “slow” exchange within some limits. 
 
Therefore regulators have to be pro-active to maintain competition. This SEBI has not 
been able to do. NSE makes large profits and rewards management while transaction 
costs remain high for users. BSE had acquired a bad name because of the dominance 
of insiders, but that governance structure was a function of the floor trading system 
and  changed  with  its  passing.  NSE  had  a  clean  image.  But  without  regulation 
corporations will try to lockin customers and create entry barriers to increase profits. 
And without competition transaction charges will not come down for consumers. 
 
The Forward Market Commission that regulates commodity market exchanges has 
allowed a number of new exchanges to enter on the philosophy that competition will 
benefits users, but SEBI has not allowed even one. Regulators have to maintain a 
system that creates the best outcomes for users, and with for profit corporations in a 
network industry competition is important, even while high standards are enforced on 
exchanges as self-regulating organizations.   
 
Equity  
Trading  in  Indian  markets  is  dominated  by  a  few  stocks,  products,  cities,  and  is 
largely short-term and cash settled. Only 1.5 percent of the population is invested in 
markets, only 100 large cap stocks are liquid, 90 percent trading volume in top 10 
cities, and in equity and commodities. AMFs, ETFs, MSEs and single stock options, 
  20are  all  underperforming  (FOFM,  2010).  FPI  inflows  have  been  able  to  dominate 
equity  markets.  More  competition  in  exchanges  may  induce  strategies  for  greater 
domestic inclusion. 
 
There is an attempt to use mobile trading to help the spread of equity culture since 
India had about 47 crore mobile connections in July 2010, while demat accounts, 
which indicate the number of investors, are only 1.6 crore. In 2010 Sebi allowed stock 
trading,  already  available  through  Internet  banking,  on  a  mobile  phone  platform. 
Brokers  will  have  to  ensure  that  they  provide  secure  access  and  encryption  for 
internet-based securities trading using wireless technology, and also take adequate 
measures for user identification, authentication and access control using means such 
as user-ID, passwords, smart cards and biometric  maps.  The  unique  identification 
number used for Internet based trading will be applicable for securities trading using 
wireless technology. 
 
 Fixed income markets 
The Indian debt market is underdeveloped, and India has a high government debt of 
80 percent of GDP. The G-secs market is deep but retail holding is negligible. Banks 
are forced to hold this through a still high statutory liquidity requirement (SLR) of 25 
percent  NDTL.  This  must  be  brought  down  and  more  government  debt  held  by 
households in a domestic retail market before freer entry of foreign rupee debt funds. 
The Greece sovereign debt crisis, and the post crisis explosion in government debts, 
suggests that risks associated with external holding of sovereign debt can be large. 
Risks include high interest rate volatility that Indian households are not yet ready to 
face. Even after removing the captive held-to-maturity part, which is not marked to 
market, G-secs available for trade in 2010 were a large10.5 lakh crores. 
 
The  corporate  bond  market  is  underdeveloped.  Suggestions  on  domestic  reforms 
required  include  rationalizing  stamp  duty,  incentivizing  development  of  market 
maker,  permitting  pension  type  funds  to  invest  in  such  instruments,  support 
mechanism  reducing  cost  of  issuing,  for  example  by  simplifying  disclosure 
documents for debt investments, and creating credit enhancement mechanisms.  
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Globally exchange traded derivatives, comprise 81 percent, and IRFs dominate in 
these. But in Indian markets the share was only 1 percent in 2009. Attempts were 
made in 2003 and in 2009 to start interest rate futures in Indian markets but they did 
not succeed. There was correction of some design flaws, such as a shift from the 
synthetic  ZCYC  to  YTM,  but  problems  remained  such  as  insistence  on  physical 
settlement. Initially there was lack of liquidity in the underlying since only two long-
term  G  secs  were  deliverable.  The  fundamental  reason  for  the  failure  of  IRFs  is 
players take positions to benefit from expected interest rate movements rather than 
hedge  risks.  This  is  the  advice  brokers  give  to  clients.  To  change  this  short-term 
interest rate surprises are required. Wider holding and more active trade in G-secs and 
start of the corporate repo would provide more users. Development of one segment 
encourages another.  
 
 FX markets 
As elsewhere OTC conducted by banks dominates, with swaps being most widely 
used. Exchange traded futures were permitted only in 2009 and saw rapid growth. But 
limitations continue such as they cannot be settled in hard currency, the low contract 
size of USD 1000 makes OTC the preferred option for large corporate deals. So day 
traders dominate and Open Interest is low. Even so there is continuous development 
with futures in multiple currencies and  options being allowed. The RBI has been 
expanding permissions from the earlier focus on underlying exposures to also allow 
indirect hedging. BIS reported that Indian FX markets had the fastest growth rate 
among world markets although this slowed down after the global crisis. Even so, FX 
markets are still thin; large spikes can occur without CB intervention, especially given 
large capital movements in a currency that is not fully convertible.  
 
These  brief  snapshots  show  the  steady  market  developments  and  the  sequence  of 
development on the long path still remaining. 
   
  227.  Structure of Regulation 
The crisis also gives lessons for the regulatory structure India should follow
8. The 
reasons  for  the  regulatory  failure  it  illustrated  in  advanced  countries  were  partly 
ideology—the  belief  in  market  efficiency a n d  s e l f - r e g u l a t i o n ,  b u t  a l s o  t h e  U S  
comparative advantage in finance. This generated political support for finance driven 
growth.  Tighter  regulation  was  thought  to  have  a  cost  in  terms  of  compliance, 
innovation foregone, and higher cost of funds. 
 
Both  regulators  and  markets  bought  into  the  dominant  paradigm  of  efficient  and 
rational markets where failures do not occur. But markets as well as regulators failed, 
implying better incentives are required for markets and less discretion for regulators. 
Financial regulation must ensure the integrity of financial markets and that finance 
meets the needs of the real economy. In addition to supervision or enforcement the 
four basic market failures require regulatory intervention: failures of information and 
inclusion,  behaviour  that  creates  procyclicality,  and  the  too  big  to  fail  (TBTF) 
syndrome.  
 
The  crisis  may  help  discover  the  right  combination  of  regulation  and  markets. 
Regulatory discretion invites excessive restraints, corruption and regulatory capture. 
But rules need to incentivize better behaviour, moderating the basic market failures 
identified. A complex enough rule can be closer to a principle-based approach, yet 
reduce  delays  and  regulatory  forbearance.  A  combination  of  micro  and  macro 
prudential regulation can usefully moderate the failures. If regulation induces better 
outcomes through creating correct incentives for market participants it would enhance 
safety without crippling the energies and initiatives of markets. 
 
There are many good reform suggestions that can be classified as principle-based 
rules.  Prudential  regulations  all  have  this  character.  Principle-based  rules  retain 
operational flexibility. For example, a rise in capital adequacy, linked to the stage of 
the  cycle  (Brunnermeier  et.  al.  2009)  (a  sharp  rise  in  credit  is  normally  a  good 
indicator)  would  have  to  be  implemented  by  the  domestic  systemic  regulator. 
Implementing  micro-prudential  standards  in  financial  markets  such  as  prompt 
                                                 
8 This section is based on Goyal (2010c) 
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Principle-based rules avoid regulatory intervention in operational decisions of firms 
 
Global coordination of basic prudential standards is also necessary. Such coordination 
can push financial firms to choose safe over risky strategies, by removing the moral 
hazard from bailouts, and assuring that the competitor is not adopting risky strategies 
either.  Competition  can  force  the  choice  of risky  strategies.  That i s  w h y  e x t e r n a l  
regulatory  standards  are  so  powerful.  If  a  bank  is  assured  its  competitor  will  not 
choose risky strategies that may allow it to make more money, it will not choose those 
strategies  either.  Universal  application  of  basic  standards  prevents  regulatory 
arbitrage.  Such  regulatory  improvement  and  harmonization  across  countries  will 
allow faster liberalization.  
 
Macro- and micro-prudential regulation each requires different skills and information. 
The best alignment of information and incentives occurs if Central Banks (CBs) are 
responsible for macro-prudential regulation, sectoral regulators for micro-prudential 
regulation,  and  there  is  good  coordination  between  the  two.  Formal  oversight 
authority over banks and markets generates information for CBs. This is useful for 
monetary  policy,  and  policy  analysis  is  useful  for  macro-prudential  tasks.  For 
example, FX and interest rate derivatives markets affect macro variables. CBs have 
become crucial for the financial sector in their role as lenders of the last resort. The 
crisis  forced  them  to  expand  this  function  beyond  banks,  as  the  financial  sector 
diversified,  its  interlinkages  thickened,  and  ability  to  inflate  balance  sheets 
procyclically  and  create  risk  increased.  More  responsibility  for  the  systemic  risk 
regulator must come with more power to check such inflation. 
 
Micro-prudential  supervisors  also  have  an  essential  role  since  they  have  detailed 
knowledge of financial markets and institutions and will have critical information to 
assess stability risks. The macro-micro regulatory split has a functional basis. An apex 
body must not be a financial market regulator like the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) in the UK, which would tend to support financial sector competitiveness and 
profitability, but a body for coordinating and sharing information led by the systemic 
risk regulator. The FSA has now been terminated as an experiment that failed, with 
responsibility for banks reverting to the Bank of England.   
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Indian Regulatory Structure  
Regulators used a combination of restrictions, supervision, and incentives with a wary 
eye on market failure. Controls had been reduced with steady market development. 
But restrictions continued for complex financial products. One of the parties entering 
into an OTC contract had to be regulated by the RBI. Guidelines on securitization 
imposed  conservative  capital  adequacy  requirements  on  exposures.  Innovation  in 
products and markets was slow. 
 
The experience of scams in the securities market, and involving a non-bank financial 
company  (NBFC),  a  cooperative  bank,  and  a  commercial  bank,  after  the  nineties 
reform, led to a strengthening and extension of supervision and prudential norms to 
cover  NBFCs.  Given  large  capital  flows  there  was  a  regulatory  focus  on 
systematically  important  non-deposit  taking  NBFCs  and  financial  conglomerates. 
Thus  the  scams  pushed  the  regulators  towards  universal  regulation,  and  towards 
closing the regulatory loopholes that plagued mature financial markets. Cross border 
flows  across  several  regulatory  jurisdictions  led  to  initiatives  for  regulatory 
coordination across borders.  
 
But most prescient were the macro-prudential regulations implemented much before 
their  worldwide  post-crises  recommendation.  Countercyclical  provisioning  and 
differentiated  risk  weights  for  bank  lending  to  bubble-prone  sectors,  such  as  real 
estate and equity markets, created incentives to moderate risky behaviour. A system 
of Prompt Corrective Action for banks based on capital adequacy, non-performing 
assets, and return on assets parameters gives an example of principle-based rules. All 
these  reduced  pro-cyclical  incentives.  There  was  an  emphasis  on  stress  tests  to 
compensate for weakness in risk models.  
 
This conservative yet forward looking regulation implies Indian banks are in such 
good health that the cost of Basel III compliance will be low. Banks tier I capital to 
risk weighted assets is 9.3 already compared to the 8 percent required. Some issues 
for  India  are  the  credit  to  GDP  ratio  is  very  low  and  must  be  allowed  to  rise 
structurally; the cost of OTC derivatives will rise; and the SLR is not accepted as a 
liquidity buffer, since it is compulsory.  
  25 
A High Level Coordination Committee for Financial Markets (HLCCFM) was formed 
in  1992  in  response  to  scams  and  regulatory  arbitrage  to  monitor  systematically 
important  institutions  with  informal  coordination  across  regulators,  with  the  RBI 
governor as Chair. In 2010 a Financial Stability and Development Council (FSDC), 
with the Finance Minister as Chair, and the RBI governor as Chair of the stability sub-
committee is to replace the HLCC. The proposal is a diluted response a series of 
reports from committees that sought to shift power away from the RBI to favour 
market  development.  But  these  reports  were  all  influenced  by  the  pre-crisis  free 
market regulatory philosophy. Worldwide the CB is being given more responsibility 
for financial stability. India was unique in moving towards reducing the role of the 
CB, despite the current regulatory structure having done well in the crisis. The RBI’s 
broader regulatory responsibilities provided information and contributed to designing 
preventive macro prudential measures. There was synergy between monetary policy 
and regulatory responsibilities over many market instruments. 
 
Apart from crisis lessons, giving more power to politicians, who had distorted India’s 
financial sector to force it to fund Government, ignores lessons from India’s history. It 
is  better  to  encourage  independent,  professional  regulatory  institutions  with  good 
interaction and peer review. 
 
The Indian regulatory structure, is however, overweight on stability. Development is 
slow.  Since  coordination  is  poor  among  government  agencies,  the  FSDC  should 
function as a strengthened HLCC. The latter was set up in a crisis, without a well 
thought-out  structure  and  function.  Better  norms  of  functioning  can  be  devised. 
Legislation  can  mandate  the  objectives  of  systemic  stability  and  market 
development
9. It can plug regulatory gaps and assign responsibility with clear time 
lines to fulfill the objectives. 
 
Better coordination is essential to deliver both stability and developm ent. Modern 
financial products do not respect regulatory boundaries. Consider the introduction of 
currency options in 2010: participating members must be registered with SEBI and 
                                                 
9 EPWRF (2009) suggest creating a Financial Market Development Agency reporting to the 
Government as in New Zealand. 
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RBI  retains  the  power  to  modify  eligibility,  limits,  margins  or  take  any  actions 
required for stability and orderly development of FX markets.  
 
Sectoral regulation is best organized on a functional basis, but inevitable overlaps 
require  a  more  complex  definition  of  functions.  Overlap  may  even  create  more 
regulatory ownership. A narrow regulatory jurisdiction can lead to neglect of the big 
picture. With its stability concerns addressed, RBI would favour deep liquid markets 
that could improve the transmission of monetary policy. Overlaps have been blamed 
for many delays but it is unclear allocation of responsibility that creates problems 
such as passing responsibility to the other, gaps in covering systemic risks, or high 
costs for industry in fuzzy dealings with many regulators.  
 
Regulators  will  coordinate  better  if  each  regulator  is  vulnerable  to  the  other.  For 
example, while trading is the primary responsibility of SEBI, where it impinges on 
monetary policy or systemic risk the RBI must continue to be involved, but with a 
mandate  for  market  development.  A  clear  allocation  of  responsibility  even  with 
interlocking regulation, could resolve delays such as in establishing corporate repos. 
The government has since clarified that SEBI will be responsible for the primary and 
secondary market in corporate bonds and RBI for corporate repos. With the systemic 
risk regulator coordinating the FSDC with a clear mandate for development, markets 
can be given more freedom to design products. The finance minister should come in 
only as a last and rare resort. 
 
8.  Concluding Remarks 
In an emerging market it is natural to regard mature markets as an ideal, so that 
domestic systems are seen as lacking. But the crisis has exposed flaws in the finance 
dominated markets and regulation of the West. Countries such as China and India that 
followed non-standard paths have done the best; it is worthwhile to study those paths 
to see what worked. It is possible the goal itself may have to be modified to some 
extent. Finance is a good tool but a bad master; the real sector must have priority.  
 
But even taking the goal as given, it is not correct to ignore the path and insist that the 
goal be reached instantly. The path may have to be long, with domestic institutions 
  27and markets strengthened before full capital account liberalization. Domestic market 
liberalization  includes  regulation  that  creates  the  correct  incentives.  Future 
liberalization must follow the principles, which have succeeded in the past, as well as 
further  India’s  critical  developmental  needs,  such  as  inclusion  and  infrastructure. 
Improved domestic markets will benefit foreign participants as well. 
 
It is necessary to ask why India and China, with some controls, have the highest 
growth rates in the world. The experience of India’s neighbours also demonstrates 
that a middling through path does best. Pakistan with a more open capital account 
suffered several shocks and had to turn to the IMF for aid often; Bangladesh that 
retained more controls needed help only once. India continued with strategic controls 
and had more successful domestic institutional and market deepening. It did not need 
the  IMF  at  all,  and  was  able  to  build  up  substantial  reserves.  So  moderate  and 
sequenced external and domestic liberalization is the way to go.      
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